COMMENTS
THE FICTITIOUS PAYEE AND THE UCC-THE DEMISE
OF A GHOST
The career of that shadowy gentleman, the fictitious payee, "affords a good
illustration of the uncertainty of law, and of the kaleidoscopic nature of the
judicial mind."' Today, most courts follow rigid rules when dealing with negotiable instruments payable to nonexistent payees, fictitious payees, or impostors. 2 In following these rules, though, the essential problem of all litigation,
the determination of liability, is often badly solved. Sensing this, judges still
expend masses of highly questionable legal logic in attempts to justify unsatisfactory distribution of loss. The imminent adoption of a final draft of the new
Commercial Code3 brings the hope that the ancient ghost may at last be laid.
This comment covers the history and present state of the law and discusses at
somewhat greater length the merits of Section 3-405 of the proposed code.
I
When a group of English commercial houses failed late in the eighteenth
century English courts first encountered negotiable instruments bearing the
names of imaginary payees. 4 In order to give greater credit to their bills, and
to avoid unsettling the bill market by their huge speculations, these houses had
made ingenious arrangements with those willing to lend them credit. The
lenders of credit had appeared either as drawers of bills payable to imaginary
but realistically named firms, or as acceptors of similar bills.s After the crash,
these signers found themselves defendants in a series of suits on the instru' Chalmers, Vagliano's Case, 7 L.Q. Rev. 216 (i89r).
2In common usage, "nonexistent" means just what the word implies: an absolutely imagi-

nary, unreal, person or firm, a name which signifies nothing. A "fictitious payee" usually indicates the name attaching to a real person or firm where the drawer or the one causing the
instrument to issue does not intend the payee ever to see the instrument. English usage is more
specific; the whole controversy under the English statute depends on just when a payee is
"fictitious."
A payee may be fictitious by accident, as when a name chosen at random as nonexistent
turns out to belong to a real person.
3Proposed Uniform Commercial Code (May draft, 1949), referred to hereafter as UCC.-V
4An earlier case, Stone v. Freeland (r769), is mentioned in a footnote, r H.B1. 316 (C.P.,
Lord Mansfield is supposed to have held liable an acceptor who had knowledge that the

1790);

drawer had indorsed the payee's name.
s Compare the devices used in the practice of "drawing and redrawing." Adam Smith,
Wealth of Nations 293 (Moder Library ed., E937) (first published, 1776).
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ments.6 Humanly, they resisted payment although they had known well that
the payees did not exist and that the defunct houses had indorsed the nonexistent payees' names. They claimed that the plaintiff-holders could not prove
the payees' indorsements. When plaintiffs pointed to defendants' knowledge,
the defendants replied that title could not be made through a forgery. The
"conscience of the case" was clear: defendants had to pay. Pay they did, generally on the ground that they were estopped to take advantage of their own
fraud.7 The judges felt that the defendants must have intended something by
their actions in putting the bills into circulation, and, since the bills could not
be payable to order, they must be treated as bearer instruments, as far as
defendants were concerned. 8 Two justices9 foreshadowed two centuries of judicial confusion by objecting to an action since in their view the bills were mere
nullities, order instruments which could not be indorsed.
In the hundred years that elapsed between the early English cases and the
great codifications of negotiable instruments law, the rule was generally accepted to be that "a bill payable to a fictitious person or his order is in effect a
bill payable to bearer, and may be declared on as such, in favor of a bona fide
holder.., against all the parties knowing that the payee was a fictitious person."- °0 During this period the modem practice of drawing order checks appeared,"r and as the codifications were enacted a new type of case began to be
litigated.
A typical case would arise as follows: A trusted clerk, charged with preparing checks, would make out a few payable to nonexistent payees, or to real
customers who had no present claims. The unsuspecting employer, signing
many checks daily, would sign these too. The clerk then stole the checks, indorsed them, and the drawee bank, recognizing the drawer's signature, paid
without question. When the fraud was discovered the indignant employer demanded the recrediting of his account. The bank resisted.
In England, the Bills of Exchange Act- provided only: "Where the payee is
6

Tatlock v. Harris, 3 T.R. 174 (K.B., x789); Vere v. Lewis, 3 T.R. X82 (K.B., 1789);
Minet v. Gibson, 3 T.R. 481 (K.B., 1789), aff'd i H.B1. 569 (H.L., 1791); Collis v. Emett,
x H.Bl. 313 (C.P., 1790). An account of the million-pound failure is found in Kyd, Bills of
Exchange 210 ff. (3d ed., x795).
7Other
grounds of recovery were considered acceptable by many judges: treating the indorsements as making new bills, the indorser assuming the payee's name; treating the lenders
of credit as having appropriated money to pay the bills, etc.
8
Already, order bills to inanimate objects were treated as bearer bills: Grant v. Vaughan,
3 Burr. 156 (K. B., 1764); argument of counsel in Tatlock v. Harris, 3 T.R. 174 (K.B., 1789).
9Eyre, C. B., and Heath, J., in Gibson v. Minet, r H.Bl. 569 (1791).
xoChitty and Hulme, Bills of Exchange 157 (ioth Am. ed., 1842). Accord: Kyd, Bills of Exchange 268 (3d ed., 1795); Bayley, Bills 26 (4th ed., 1822); see Johnson, Bills 26 (2d ed., 1839).
11See opinion of Burton, J., in Agricultural Savings Ass'n v. Federal Bank, 6 Ont. App. R.

192, 197

(18ft).

"45 &46 Vict., c. 61, § 7(3) (1882), cited as "BEA.'"
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a fictitious or non-existing person the bill may be treated as payable to bearer."
In the historic case of Vagliano v. Bank of EnglandZ3 the House of Lords decided
that the statute changed the prior law. An English bill is payable to bearer if
the payee is nonexistent, regardless of what the drawer thought he was doing
when he drew it.' 4 If the payee is real and known to the drawer, who intended
to pay him, then the bill is not payable to bearer where a clerk fraudulently
caused the bill to be drawn.' s In the vague middle ground between these situawithin
tions it seems to be possible for a payee to be real, and yet "fictitious"
6
the meaning of the act, on the authority of the Vagliano case.
In the United States, Section 9(3) of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments
Law17 adds a clause to the British section: "The instrument is payable to
bearer... (3)when it is payable to the order of a fictitious or non-existent person,' 8 and such fact was known to the person making it so payable ...." A

leading New York case which has been almost universally followed,9 Shipman
v. Bank of the State of New York,' held that it was impossible for an order check
to be treated as payable to bearer, under a New York statute similar to the
NIL,2 unless the drawer-the actual signer-intended the payee to have no
interest; the NIL did not change the common law in this respect. But, where
the earliest English cases had rested mainly on a simple estoppel of the drawer
with knowledge to claim his formal rights, that is, to have the holder prove
the payee's indorsement, the American courts have resorted to numerous
13 22 Q.B.D. 1o3 (r888), aff'd 23 Q.B.D. 243 (1889), rev'd [i8gi] A.C. 107. Noted, Chalmers, op. cit. supra note r; Butterworth, The Vagliano case in Australia, ioL.Q. Rev. 40
(1894); Adams, The Vagliano Case, 7 L.Q. Rev. 295 (i8gi). Adams suggests that the real culprit was the clerk's stockbroker, who should have been put on inquiry when he saw a poor
clerk speculating with huge sums (;71,ooo).
'4 Clutton v. Attenborough, [1897] A.C. 9o; London Life Ins. Co. v. Molsons Bank, 5 Ont.

L.R. 407 (i9o3), aff'd 8 Ont. L.R. 238 (1904).

IsVinden v. Hughes, [igo5] I K.B. 795; North & South Wales Bank v. Macbeth, [igo8]
A.C. 137. See Falconbridge, Fictitious or Non-existing Payee, 43 Can. L.J. 225 (i9o7); Chalmers, Bills 27 (ioth ed., 1932).
and Butterworth, op. cit. supra
z6 For some light, see Falconbridge, op. cit. supra note i5,
note 13. A good guess would seem to be that English bills will fall within BEA § 7(3) unless
the drawer had actual knowledge that the payee was in existence. Note, though, that no English bank is liable if it pays in good faith on a forged indorsement. BEA § 6o.
17Cited as NIL.
28The following clause was not in Crawford's first draft of the NIL: Beutel's Brannan,
NIL xixg n. (b) ( 7th ed., 31948).
'9 Save for a few unimportant cases: Kohn v. Watkins, 26 Kan. 691 (i882); Equitable Life
Assurance Society Co. v. Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 181 S.W. 1176 (Mo. App., 1916); see Lane
v. Krekel, 22 Ia. 399 (x867). Compare the discussion in Beutel's Brannan, NIL 332 ff. (7th
ed., 1948).
21126 N.Y. 318, 27 N.E. 371 (i891). Earlier New York cases are substantially similar:
Welsh v. German-American Bank, 73 N.Y. 424 (1878); Frank v. Chemical Nat'l Bank, 84
N.Y. 209 (i88i).
ari Rev. Stat. 768, § 5 (Bank's ed., i889), provided for validity against the maker and

others with knowledge as if the instrument were payable to bearer. See discussion infra of the
Illinois amendment to NIL § 9(3).
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fanciful arguments to justify the results of their (undoubtedly correct) construction of Section 9 (3).
The fact complexes, as usual, have not adjusted themselves to any easilystated rule. The problem of who is the "person making it so payable" has
caused some litigation, but the present law' is fairly definite. If an officer of a
company who has. check-issuing powers decides to defraud the company by
issuing checks payable to fictitious payees and then abstracts, indorses and
cashes the checks, the checks are payable to bearer.- But if a clerk, no matter
how trusted, makes out checks to fictitious payees which are signed, no matter
how mechanicall)3 2sby an authorized officer without knowledge of the fraud,
25
if the clerk pads a payroll,
the checks are not payable to bearerM Similarly,
claims.26
or if an insurance agent submits false
Mueller & Martin v. Liberty Ins. Bank, 187 Ky. 44, 218 S.W. 465 (1920); Snyder v. Corn
Exchange Nat'1 Bank, 221 Pa. 599, 7o AtI. 876 (i9o8). The rule may be different if the checks
are drawn by an authorized officer of the United States. United States v. Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 2o5 Fed. 433 (C.A. 9th, I913), second appeal 224 Fed. 679 (C.A. 9th, 1915). However,
Trust
the government was held bound by the impostor rule in Continental-American Bank &
Co. v. United States, 161 F. 2d 935 (C.A. 5th, 1947), and United States v. First Nat'l Bank &
Trust Co., 92 F. Supp. 356 (N.C., ig5o).
Courts trying to operate under NIL § 9(3) are faced with a curious problem when two officers are required to sign checks and only one knows the payee is fictitious. Some have decided
that one is enough to make the check payable to bearer. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Wells
Fargo Bank, i Cal. App. 2d 694,37 P. 2d 483 (1934); Penn. Co. v. Federal Reserve Bank, 3o F.
Supp. 982 (Pa., 1939); Globe Indemnity Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 133 S.W. 2d io66 (Mo. App.,
Bank, 171 Ore.
1939). Contra: Portland Postal Employees' Credit Union v. United States Nat'l
40, 135 P. 2d 467 (I943). See Bourne v. Md. Casualty Co., x85 S.C. i, 192 S.E. 6o (1937);
aff'd
Union Bank & Trust Co. v. Security-First Nat'l Bank, 57 P. 2d 1332 (Cal. App., 1936),
8 Cal. 2d 303, 65 P. 2d 355 (1937). To be consistentwith the strict drawer-equals-signer equation the opposite decision is indicated, for the check is not valid until both sign.
presumably the operator
23 If the authorized signature were actually affixed by a machine,
who
of the machine would be the person making the check payable. But a "signing officer"
Security-First
a
"persbn."
be
to
left
will
free
enough
has
day
a
times
writes his name 8oo-1500
Cal.
Nat'l Bank v. Bank of America, 129 P. 2d 424 (Cal. App., 1942), rev'd 137 P. 2d 452, 22
2d 154 (I943). See note 24 infra.
24Cases cited note 20 supra, United States Cold Storage Co. v. Central Mfg. District Bank,
Co., 71 Ga. App. 797,
343 Ill. 503, I75 N.E. 825 (1931); First Nat'l Bank v. American Surety
xi8 A.L.R.-x5 (1939); Beutel's Brannan,
in
collected
are
cases
of
scores
(1944);
2(1402
S.E.
o
3
( 7 th ed., 1948); Kulp, The Fictitious Payee, 18 Mich. L. Rev. 296 (1920).
NIL 315 ft.
Even when a bank's cashier issues a cashier's check at a customer's request, the cashier is
Nat'l
held to be the person making the check payable, and his "intent" governs. Seaboard
Bank v. Bank of America, I93 N.Y. 26, 85 N.E. 829 (I9O8); Paihe v. Continental & CommerApp. 526 (I931). But cf. Union Bank & Trust Co. v. Security-First
cial Nat'l Bank, 259 Ill.
(i937). In
Nat'l Bank, 57 P. 2d 1332 (Cal. App., 1936), aff'd 8 Cal. 2d 303, 65 P. 2d 355
the
American Express Co. v. People's Say. Bank, X92 Iowa 366, i81 N.W. 701 (192i), where
check, the
company exchanged checks on itself to fictitious payees for a worthless personal
checks were held not payable to bearer, since the company's "intent" was not fulfilled.
25American Sash & Door Co. v. Commerce Trust Co., 332 Mo. 98, 56 S.W. 2d 1034 (1932).
were held not payable to
6Checks to existing policyholders on fake claims (by an agent)
92 (I97); Nat'l Union
App.
111.
246
bearer in Nat'l Surety Co. v. Halsted Street State Bank,
holdFire Ins. Co. v. Mellon Nat'l Bank, 276 Pa. 212, ri9 Atl. 9io (1923). There was a similar
208
Bank,
City
Nat'l
v.
Co.
Ins.
Caledonian
in
"policyholders"
nonexistent
to
ing as to checks
N.Y. App. Div. 83, 203 N.Y. Supp. 32 (1924).
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Equally fine distinctions are drawn when the payee named is a firm on the
edge of legal existence. If a company is defrauded into issuing checks' to a firm
which the signing officer thinks is real, but which is not, the checks are said
to remain unindorsable nullities.27 But if the clerk or his confederate has set up
a dummy firm and filed a certificate of doing business, then the indorsement
of one "authorized" to sign for thedummy firm is quite valid. ' Hence the
clerk's choice of a convenient device to cash checks results, fortuitously, in de29
termining whether the drawer carries the loss.
There is at least one well-recognized exception to the rigorous application of
Section 9(3): the impostor rule. If a defrauder represents himself to be someone else in a face-to-face encounter with the drawer of a check, and the drawer
issues the check to the defrauder under the assumed name, the check is usually
treated as properly indorsable by the impostor. It is said that the intent to pay
the visible man outweighs the intent to pay to the assumed name. But, when
the imposture is by mail, the drawer may avoid loss. Where an impostor falsely
represents himself to be the agent of a nonexistent principal and the check is
drawn to his "principal," the impostor rule does not apply, and the check cannot be indorsed by the impostor so as to pass title.30
In an attempt to circle around the prevailing Section 9(3) interpretation,
drawees and holders have often claimed that drawers were negligent in allowing
instruments to issue.3' Rarely have these attempts succeeded.32 Usually, it is
27Segal v. Nat'l City Bank of N.Y., I83 N.Y. Misc. 994, 52 N.Y.S. 2d 727 (1944); Int'l Aircraft Trading Co. v. Manufacturers Trust Co., 297 N.Y. 285, 79 N.E. 2d 249 (1948).
28Bank of N.Y. v. Public Natl Bank & Trust Co., 195 N.Y. Misc. 812, 82 N.Y.S. 2d 694
(1948), aff'd 3oi N.Y. 503, 93 N.E. 2d 71 (I95O).
29Banks in which such paper may be deposited require such a certificate or other authorization before they will allow withdrawals of funds under a firm's (or corporation's) name. Thus
some slight protection is still offered to the drawer.
30Strang v. Westchester County Nat'l Bank, 235 N.Y. 68, 138 N.E. 739 (1923); and
McCornack v. Central State Bank, 203 Iowa 838, 211 N.W. 542 (1926), are typical impostoragent cases. Russell v. Second Nat'l Bank, 136 N.J.L. 270, 55 A. 2d 211 (i947), makes the distinction between the impostor and impostor-agent situations very forcibly, applying both rules
in the same case.
Any attempt to cite cases following "the" impostor rule is fairly futile in the light of Professor Abel's learned, convincing, and exhaustively annotated article, "The Impostor Payee: Or,
Rhode Island Was Right" [i94o] Wis. L. Rev. 161 and 363. Taking Tolman v. American Nat'l
Bank, 22 R.I. 462, 48 Atl. 480 (x9o), usually cited as a refusal to follow the impostor rule,
Professor Abel demonstrates that in a considerable number of cases the impostor rule as actually applied carries a qualification: the loss falls on the drawer unless he has exercised care and
the holder or payor has exercised none.
For discussions of imposture by mail see Abel, supra at 172, 173, and The Impostor Rule, 23
Ind. L.J. 484 (1948)Cohen v. Lincoln Sav. Bank of Brooklyn, 275 N.Y. 399, io N.E. 2d 457 (1937), should be
noted as tacking a special requirement onto the impostor rule: there must be an antecedent
fraud by which the drawer was induced to enter into the transaction.
31 Almost all the cases cited in notes 20, 24 supra, involve such claims.
32One success (with a strong dissent): Defiance Lumber Co. v. Bank of Cal., i8o Wash.
533, 41 P. 2d 135 (i935); see Detroit Piston Ring Co. v. Wayne County & Home Sav. Bank,
252

Mich. i63, 233 N.W. 185 (193o).
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said that the drawer's negligence must relate to the forgery itself and not to
s
the issuance of the check, if he is to be charged with the loss."
This, in brief, is the present state of the law.34 Drawee and collecting banks
or those buying checks from defrauders bear most losses on checks drawn to
fictitious payees. The current draft of the UCC makes some bold changes. Before final adoption, however, it is proper to reassess the old arguments which
have so long supported the prevailing rules.
11
In commercial law, perhaps more than in any other field, justice Brandeis'
famous dictum holds true: "[Ilt is more important that the applicable rule of
law be settled than that it be settled right."35 To the banker and the businessman litigation is a positive evil. If under a new commercial statute claims cannot be quickly and surely adjusted without lawsuits, the drafting lawyers have
failed. The rules of the commercial game should of course distribute burdens
equitably, placing losses where justice and sound economic policy require them
to be placed; but above all the rules should allow the game to be played fast
and without hesitation.
The essential problem posed by the fictitious payee cases is well recognized:
"The issue, as a large scale matter, is one between collecting bankers on the
one hand ... and corporate business on the other."36 As between the two, jus-

tice appears to be more on the side of the banks. A bank cannot often be sure
of the validity of a payee's signature. This is not always a good excuse: When
a legitimate order instrument is stolen, and a bank pays on the forged indorsement, the loss properly falls on the bank.7 A different rule would destroy much
of the usefulness of negotiable instruments as tools of trade. But the fictitious
payee and impostor cases are another matter.
Many justifications are offered in support of the majority rules in the various
fictitious payee situations. Most decisions speak of the bank's obligation, at its
peril, to carry out the drawer's intent.' 8 Such statements are meaningless. The
3' This is the old common-law rule. Agricultural Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Fed. Bank, 6 Ont.
App. R. X92 (i88i).
34 Ignoring many problems such as business names, estates and officers for the time being
as possible fictitious payees. Most of these problems are simple and are usually handled correctiy. But see Hansen v. Northwestern Nat'l Bank, 375 Minn. 453, 221 N.W. 873 (x928).
Kulp, op. cit. supra note 24, covers all these side issues thoroughly. Compare UCC § 3-1io.
3s Dissent in Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 4o6 (1932). Abel, op. cit.
supra note 3o , at 389 ff., rejects the certainty criterion on grounds which may have been appropriate in discussing case law in i94o but which should ndt concern the drafters of a new
code.
36Steffen, Cases on Commercial and Investment Paper 395 (I939).
37 4 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 67o, 672 (1937), noting Union Biank & Trust Co. v. Security First
Nat'l Bank, 8 Cal. 2d 303, 65 P. 2d 355 (x937), does not even admit this.
38 The Shipman case is the prototype. Under NIL § 9(3), the drawer's intent is crucial,

but this lends no cogency to the statements about "the bank's duty." NIL § 9(3) specifically
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drawer's intent was frustrated ab initio by his dishonest employee. Though any
discussion of intent is sterile, yet, as between an "intent" to issue a scrap of
paper, misleadingly in form like a check,39 and the drawer's belief that he is
issuing a valid order instrument to pay out money, the latter does appear as
his natural, true, intent.
Again, according to the Section 9(3) it is necessary for the drawer to know
that the payee is fictitious if he is to bear the loss. The guilty clerk's knowledge,
it is said, cannot be attributed to the corporation-drawer, because of an immutable principle of agency law.40 While any discussion of agency law is beyond
the scope of this comment, it is well to point out that this application is highly
rarefied.4" To anyone but a lawyer, there is no real distinction between an
employee who fills out and signs checks and one who fills out checks and submits them by the score to be mechanically signed by an authorized officer. A
corporation too easily escapes liability by selecting an honest but insulated
assistant treasurer. Honesty is easy to find in rubber stamps.
The usually unsuccessful attempts of banks to claim that drawers have been
negligent arouse a certain sympathy. Yet, the courts rejecting the claims of
negligence are acting wisely, though the arguments supporting their decisions
are palpably weak. Commercial matters should not often go to an expensive
jury trial with the result depending in part on the whims and antipathies of
untutored jurymen.41

While there is satisfaction in "economic" analyses of risk which assign losses
makes it the bank's duty to bear losses when the drawer did not know what he was doing.
When the drawer knows what he was doing, as drawing to a certain John Smith, and the bank
cashes the check on another John Smith's signature, then indeed the bank has failed in its duty
to carry out the drawer's intent. Mead v. Young, 4 T.R. 28 (K.B., 1790). But this last example
is really a standard forgery, unless, of course, there has been an imposture. Compare Abel, op.
cit.
supra note 30, at 2o5 ff., on the minimal usefulness of the dominant intent (of the drawer)
explanation in the impostor cases.
39 "Hamlet: Do you see yonder cloud that's almost in shape of a camel?
Polonius: By the mass, and 'tis like a camel indeed.
Hamlet: Methinks it is like a weasel.
Polonius: It is backed like a weasel.
Hamlet: Or like a whale?
Polonius: Very like a whale."
-Hamlet, Act III, Scene 2.
503, 175 N.E. 825
40 United States Cold Storage Co. v. Central Mfg. District Bank, 343 Ill.
(1937), contains a typical discussion, as does the Shipman case.
41For example, the citing of Cave v. Cave, L.R. 15 Ch. Div. 639 (i88o), in the Shipman
case.
4 See note 32 supra. The author of a case note, 97 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 122 (1948), objects to
language in a recent New York case, Int'l Aircraft Trading Co. v. Manufacturers Trust Co.,
297 N.Y. 285, 79 N.E. 2d 249 (1948), which seems to imply that no conceivable negligence of
the drawer will result in his bearing the loss. Even in the worst cases, though, a gross negli-

gence exception seems undesirable. Better to change the rule.
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to the proper enterprise unit, these speculations are not too helpful here. 43 No
"tentrepreneur rule" will fulfill certainty requirements. One such argument is
forceful, however: embezzlement, like sin, is undesirable. Good internal organization in a corporation makes it difficult for employees to carry out frauds. If
banks, and not employers bear fraud losses, there is no pressure on companies
to organize their affairs to minimize these losses.44
It can be said in support of Section 9(3) that under it, in theory, banks can
avoid most losses.45 If the collecting banks look to their depositors, making sure
of their responsibility, the bank will have an action back should the payee's
signature be forged.4 6 The depositors can sue up the line on the indorsements,
the argument runs, and thus eventually the one who originally cashed the
check for the thief will suffer the loss, which is delightful, and in accordance
with principle.47 Practically, the scheme may break down. Some checks are
cashed directly with the drawee bank by the wrongdoer. Small businesses cash
a great many checks. Such concerns may not be good for any large amount, and
recoveries in small cases often will scarcely pay the expenses of suit.4s The

number of suits multiplies.
On the other hand, if drawers were forced to take all these risks, they would
not only be less negligent, but much litigation would be avoided. A drawer's
43 Even a Daniel would have difficulty in deciding between bank and companies in these
terms. Banks, after all, make a business of dealing with checks, and receive the use of the deposited money. Yet the accidental placing of fictitious payee losses on banks, as opposed to
other embezzlement losses, has no great appeal. It is the company which has the opportunity
of preventing the loss, as has been said. And why should not these losses be treated as a risk
of business, rather than of banking? Compare comment (4)to UCC § 3-405. At any rate, bank
charges reflect bank costs, and companies pay for what they get. The situation of a holder
caught with a check to a fictitious payee is too often a sad one under the NIL: he may not be
insured (or self-insured). As to forgery losses in general, see 14 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 705 (1947),
noting R. H. Kimball, Inc. v. R.I. Hospital Nat'l Bank, 72 R.I. 144, 4 8A. 2d 420 (1946).
44 This argument should be distinguished from the one which would place losses on employers of agents since they can select honest men. Compare comment (4) to UCC § 3-404.
Until the science of psychology is perfected, it will be impossible to hire only honest men. No
Diogenes, only a good accountant, is required to set up procedures to avoid payroll padding.
Compare Defiance Lumber Co. v. Bank of Cal., i8o Wash. 533, 41 P. 2d 135 (1935).
4s In 14 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 705, 709 n. I9 (1947), noting R. H. Kimball, Inc. v. R.I. Hospital Nat'l Bank, 72 R.I. 144,48 A. 2d 420 (1946), it is estimated that total U.S. forgery losses
(including fictitious payee losses?) run to only $8oo,ooo a year. This would seem to make the
whole problem relatively minor. The estimate is wrong, in the opinion of counsel for a large

Chicago bank. After all, several illustrious swindlers have put themselves into what Franklin
P. Adams called "the six-figure, or non-hay bracket": Glyka (Vagliano's Case) lifted £ 71,000,
Bedell (Shipman case) took almost $2oo,ooo, and Nickel (Bank of N.Y. case, note 28 supra)
achieved a score of more than $3ooooo. One regrets that a certain Swindels, name notwithstanding, contented himself with a few thousands (Welsh case, note 20 supra).
46UCC § 3-417 gives the bank an immediate action against all indorsers on their warranties,
whereas NIL § 66 gives such an action only to holders, not payors.
47Thus the argument in 97 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 122 n. 3 (1948), noting Int'l Aircraft Trading
Co. v. Manufacturers Trust Co., 297 N.Y. 285, 79 N.E. 2d 249 (1948).
48 This is an important and frequent vexation, according to a lawyer for a large Chicago
bank.
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failure in his suit to have his account recredited would be final. This would be
bad for lawyers, perhaps, but good for the interests they serve.
III
The UCC provides:
§3-405. Impostors; Signature in Name of Payee.

(i) With respect to a holder in due course or a person paying the instrument in good
faith an indorsement is effective when made in the name of the specified payee by
any of the following persons, or their agents or confederates:
(a) an impostor who through the mails or otherwise has induced the maker or
drawer to issue the instrument to him or his confederate in the name of the
payee;
(b) a person signing as or on behalf of a drawer who intends the payee to have no
interest in the instrument;
(c) an agent or employee of the drawer who has supplied him with the name of the
payee intending the latter to have no such interest.49

The intent of this provision, as has been indicated, is laudable;so but there
are difficulties. One grave imperfection is suggested in a report to a subcommittee of the Chicago Bar Association.Sr Section 3-405 is open to the construction that the burden is on the holder of proving that the defrauder (or confederate) was the actual indorser.S The writers of the report object to this. The
49 There is some loose drafting here. First, to say, "With respect to a holder in due
course" begs the whole question. What must be meant is, "With respect to one othenvise a
holder in due course...." In any event, the words are unnecessary. Even if the indorsement
is good, the rights of a holder will turn on other sections, and will depend on just whether or
not he is a holder in due course. Compare UCC § 3-3o5. In fact, the limitation to holders in
due course is positively undesirable. Suppose the case where drawer D intentionally makes a
note payable to a nonexistent payee, indorses the payee's name, and passes the note to A in
the course of a transaction in which there is a partial failure of consideration. A indorses to B
after maturity. Now B cannot be a holder in due course and hence, under the section, he is
not even a holder by indorsement. But there is no reason to make B take a total loss. He is at
least entitled, as against D, to whatever A could get; but even A's position is doubtful under
the section.
Second, while subsection (a) applies to a "maker or drawer," the maker has mysteriously
disappeared from (b) and (c). Surely these omissions are not purposeful.
Third, there is no mention at all of indorsers or indorsees. Yet a case where an indorser
through an employee's fraud indorses to a fictitious or nonexistent payee is indistinguishable
from a case where a maker or drawer signs an instrument to a similar payee.
Fourth, as subsection (b) reads, no indorsement would be good except that of the "person
signing" or of his "agents or confederates." This excludes the quite normal case where the agent
who signs has nothing to do with the subsequent indorsement and delivery, say by the company's president, who in no real sense is the agent or confederate of the signer.
so Palmer, Negotiable Instruments Under the U.C.C., 48 Mich. L. Rev. 255, 284 (1950),
calls § 3-405 "a first-rate achievement."
"1Report of Chicago Bar Association Subcommittee B, Section to Consider Articles 3 & 4

UCC (195o) (Steffen, Huggins, Lamey).

S2 Under NIL § 9(3), the impostor exception is not applied if the impostor himself does
not
indorse, on the grounds that the drawer intended the impostor, no one else, as payee. J. C.
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situation is posed where a thief steals a check which the signer has intended
not to be payable to the named payee. Under present law this is the classical
bearer-payable situation. Under the proposed law, the thief's transfer is bad.
The authors say that "this is not good sense."-5
The report suggests two possible solutions. Either the payee's signature
should be conclusively presumed to be regular, or, as they prefer, such paper
should be made payable to bearer, at least as against the drawer. The latter
solution, without the qualification, has been adopted in Illinois and seven other
states5 4 by amending NIL Section 9(3) to read:
The instrument is payable to bearer:... (3)When it is payable to the order of a
fictitious or non-existent or living person not intended to have any interest in it, and
such fact was known to the person making it so payable, or known to his employee or
other agent who supplies the name of such payee... .5s

The Illinois provision has its own defects. The early English cases show that
the device of calling an order instrument to a fictitious payee payable to bearer
was adopted as a simplification in pleading because of the rigid rule that one
suing on order paper had to prove the payee's indorsement. Most of the preNIL cases recognize that it is as against the drawer or acceptor with knowledge
that the instrument is to be treated as payable to bearer: only another way of
saying that as againstthem the payee's signature need not be proved. But the
Illinois provision makes the instrument simply payable to bearer. Anomalies
result.56
Suppose the situation where a drawer intentionally draws a check to a nonexistent payee, indorses it, and passes it to X..The check is stolen from X,
and the thief passes it to Y, forging X's indorsement. Under the Illinois amendment, while the draw6r must see that the check is paid, X, who thought he had
a perfectly valid order instrument, takes a loss, and Y, who thought he was
buying an order instrument, with all the attendant risks, receives a windfall.
Such a result is foolish.5 7 The UCC definitely disposes of this possibility by
Hockett Co. v. Simmonds, 87 N.E. 2d 739 (Ohio App., 1949). Such a decision is arbitrary to an
extreme, the arbitrariness not lessened by the highly imaginary justification offered. UCC
§ 3-405 partially corrects the situation by specifying "persons, or their agents or confederates."
53 Nor

is it.

54

Ga., Ida., La., Mo., Mont., N.M., Wis.

s5Applied in Houghton Mifflin Co.v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank and Trust Co., 293 Ill.
App. 423, 12 N.E. 2d 714 (1938); Swift &Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 28o N.Y. 135, 1g N.E. 2d
(1939). Before the amendment, Illinois followed the majority (Shipman) rule. United
States Cold Storage Co. v. Central Mfg. District Bank, 343 Ill. 503, 175 N.E. 825 (r93).
56All of the following discussion is also true of NIL § 9(3).
S7Even under the Illinois amendment [and NIL § 9(3)] a court might reach the correct
result in the situation posed by drawing an analogy with NIL § 4o .For, while Y might be
permitted to recover of the drawer as a holder of bearer paper, he could not recover of X upon
the forged indorsement, and it would seem that as between X and Y the prior right of X to the
paper or its proceeds would be protected. It must be admitted that no such case seems to
have been reported yet. But surely code drafters should anticipate everything.
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abolishing the bearer device. There should be, though, an unmistakable command that the payee's indorsement is to be conclusively presumed regular.58
Part (a) of UCC Section 3-405 attempts to clarify and codify the impostor
rule. Apparently, however, when the impostor pretends to be an agent of a
nonexistent principal, the present rule is to remain ifi force, and the drawer is
to be protected.5 9 This is a distinction without a difference. It places, rightly,
the responsibility for ascertaining bona fides on the drawer if the impostor pretends to be a principal, but allows a reckless disregard for the safety of the commercial community if the impostor claims to be an agent of such a principal.
Again, it is reliance on arguments about the drawer's "intent" which leads to
such anomalies. The real reasons for placing losses on drawers in all impostor
situations are exactly those which make it fair for drawers to bear fictitious
payee losses.
Subsection (c) of UCC Section 3-405 wisely makes no distinctions between,
nonexistent payees and real payees who are or are not known to the drawer,
thus avoiding the tangle into which the BEA led the English courts. Yet provisions (b) and (c) are still not satisfactory. That legal fact, but practical uncertainty, "intent" remains as the touchstone of liability.6° Some more concrete
test seems advisable. Subjectively, the satisfying test for liability seems to
depend on whether the payee, if real, has any right to the instrument. All bills
drawn to nonexistent payees should result in losses to drawers, if to anyone,
regardless of intent.
To suggest a provision such as this, which places the loss on the drawer whenever the named payee has no interest in the instrument, would be to make one
58 Such a presumption would eliminate the need for the "agents or confederates" language
in UCC § 3-405.

Section 6i of the NIL already states that the drawer admits the existence of the payee and

his then capacity to indorse. Usually courts completely ignore the section. The opinion of

MacLaren, J., in London Life Ins. Co. v. Molsons Bank, 8 Ont. L. R. 238 (1904), is an exception, applying BEA § 55 (i)(b) (equivalent to NIL § 61) to place the loss on the drawer. In
Robertson Banking Co. v. Brasfield, 202 Ala. 167, 79 So. 651 (ig8), and McCornack v. Central State Bank, 203 Iowa 833, 2ii N.W. 542 (1926), the courts wrestled with NIL § 61, but
did not apply it, over dissents. Compare UCC § 3-413, and Drawee Liability, 29 Neb. L. Rev.
96 (X949).

NIL § 6x is absolutely inconsistent with NIL § 9(3). For NIL § 9(3) requires the drawer
or maker to know that the payee is nonexistent if an instrument payable to a nonexistent payee
is to be treated as payable to bearer. If the drawer does not know, the instrument is unindorsable order paper: a nullity. And, a drawer refusing to pay such paper is denying the existence of the payee, not to mention the payee's capacity to indorse.
However, BEA § 7(3), as interpreted, is consistent with BEA § 55(1) (b). For British paper
is payable to bearer whenever the payee is nonexistent. Clutton v. Attenborough, [1897]
A.C. go; London Life v. Molsons Bank, supra. Thus, NIL § 61 may be explained as an anomalous carryover from a consistent BEA. The trouble with this explanation is, it assumes that
the drafters of BEA § 7(3) knew what they were doing, which may not be true. Chalmers,
Vagliano's Case, 7 L.Q. Rev. 216 (i891).

s9 In the past, drawers have been protected from what certainly looks like their own folly.
Cohen v. Lincoln Savings Bank of Brooklyn, 275 N.Y. 399, 10 N.E. 2d 457 (1937)6o That is, a definition of "fictitious" has been substituted for the word.
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more change in present law. For, in addition to covering the padded payroll
cases, for example, it would include all situations where a check is made out by
mistake to a real payee to whom no money is owing.6 In these instances,
though, the loss should fall on the drawer. The man who draws and issues such
a check shoots his arrow into the air. If when it falls someone is wounded financially, in all justice the archer should see to the wound.62 Banks already bear
many another loss.
IV
In summary, the drafters of UCC Section 3-4o5 have made some progress,
but not enough. A different version could unite the treatment of impostors,
nonexistent payees, real payees with no interest, and real payees intended by
the drawer to have no interest, all on a subjectively satisfying basis. For example:
§3-405. Where Indorsement Is Conclusively Presumed Effective; "Fictitious" or Nonexistent Payees; Impostors.
An indorsement by any person in the name of the named payee or indorsee is to be conclusively presumed effective to transfer the instrument where the named payeeor indorsee:
(a) does not exist; or
(b) exists, but has no interest in the instrumet; or
(c)exists and has an interest in the instrument, but the instrument is issued to an impostor (eitherface-to-face or at a distance) of the named payee or ilzdorsee.6 '
6zEven under present law, if the intended payee does indorse, the indorsement is good,
though the payee has no claim to the money. See Bank of N.Y. v. Public Nat'l Bank & Trust
Co., i95 N.Y. Misc. 812, 82 N.Y.S. 2d 694 (1948). The proposal below would make any in-

dorsement effective in such case. Certainly, if the payee had no claim and the paper had never
been received, who indorsed it would be a matter of indifference to the named payee. On the
other hand, if the payee has any claim, even overstated or mistaken, his actual indorsement
should be required.
6
2All the rather soggy figure is intended to convey is that the same arguments apply here
for placing the loss on the drawer as apply in the fictitious payee cases. Or to put it another way,
all payees who have no interest in the instruments in question should be treated as fictitious.
6sItshould be noted that Subsection (b) of the proposal reads "no interest in the instrument." The proposal does not include the cases where a payee has another claim against the
drawer, perhaps an inchoate claim in process of litigation, or more likely a sum due on an unconnected transaction. The proposed section might read, "If the named payee or indorsee has
no connection with the transaction giving rise to the instrument." But this is clumsy. Of
course, either way some part of the drawer's intent is dragged in the back door.
One application: suppose an impostor pretends to be the igent for a well-known charity
and obtains donations in the form of checks payable to the charity. The impostor-agent cannot
validly indorse under the proposed section, for the payee has an interest in the check. This
result is fair, for the situation is equivalent to one where a check made out to a creditor is given
to someone claiming to be the creditor's messenger.
Finally, it may be noted that both the present suggestion and UCC § 3-405 shift losses
from collecting banks to paying banks on some cashier's checks. Thus, under neither can a
bank escape liability, when it does not know a man demanding payment, by issuing a cashier's
check to him under the name he gives. However, it may be that paying banks could still avoid
loss in this situation by certifying the tendered check. See Steffen and Starr, A Blue Print for
the Certified Check, 13 N.C.L. Rev. 450 (1935).
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Such a provision states an equitable, simple, legally elegant test for liability.
It finds a rightful place in a code that is truly Commercial: one designed to
serve commerce.

THE NEW YORK AND CALIFORNIA EXPERIMENTS
WITH ACADEMIC CONTROL
Since in a democracy all men are rulers, all men
must have the education that rulers ought to have.
-ROBERT

M. HUTCHINS'

The anti-radical feeling following the first world war reached the schools
through such measures as the Lusk Law2 and then quickly subsided. In the
long period from the early twenties to the present time the central issues of
academic freedom seemed to center around causes c6lbres involving individuals. Now, with such measures as the Feinberg Law in New York and the loyalty
oath requirement at the University of California, the problem is broadening
again. The re-evaluation of government personnel in terms of loyalty3 has
spread to the personnel of state schools. Corruption of the youth joins sedition
and espionage as an immediate threat to the American way of life. The private
school has been dealt with by informal pressure4 partly because the loyalty of
government personnel is the primary concern of the day and partly because the
freedom the state has in choosing its employees s avoids, legally at least, the
problems of free speech involved in preventing private institutions from teaching disapproved doctrines or hiring disapproved personnel. 6 As international
tension mounts, the problem of balancing the traditional American freedoms
*Hutchins, T. S. Eliot on Education, i Measure 5 (Winter, i95o).
2 The Lusk Law, N.Y. Laws (1921) c. 667, required the licensing of private educational institutions and forbade the licensing of institutions teaching the violent overthrow of the government. It was primarily aimed at the Rand School, a socialist school. The law was repealed
after a year. N.Y. Laws (1923) c. 799. Consult Chafee, Free Speech in the United States, c. 8
(The Rand School Case) (194i), for a complete discussion of the case.
3Consult Emerson and Helfeld, Loyalty among Government Employees, 58 Yale LJ. i
(1948).
4Some legislatures have rattled the investigative sword at private schools, as did a com-

mittee of the Illinois legislature which conducted an investigation of the University of Chicago.
The committee sent an investigator and later held hearings. It made no definite assertions
about the University of Chicago although it did undertake to show that some of the faculty
members were members of "communist fronts." Consult Special Report of Seditious Activities
Investigation, State of Illinois (1949); Report of the Seditious Activities Commission, State
of Illinois (1949). The Testimony of Chancellor Hutchins, at 17 et seq. of the Special Report,
is particularly noteworthy.
s Consult note 49 infra.
6Thus even the Internal Security Act, popularly known as the McCarren Act, ,requires
only registration of private communist organizations and the labeling of communist propaganda. H.R. 949o, 81 Cong. 2d Sess. (Pub. L. No. 31, 195o).

